The Issue of Statutory Interpretation in the Nigerian Legal System and Measures Devised by the Court to Mitigate the Distress.

By Nengi Edmund Abam

Introduction

Law making in Nigeria is the duty of the legislative arm of government, and this is

effectuated by virtue of section 4 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic

of Nigeria (CFRN), while the function of the courts/judiciary is to interpret and apply the law. This is also effectuated by virtue of section 6 of the 1999 CFRN.

In interpreting the laws made by the legislature, the court is not permitted to invite the lawmaker to explain what the provisions of any law mean. The burden of finding the intention of the lawmaker lies on the judge, through the medium of the words used by the lawmaker.

However, it has not always been very easy to ascertain the intention of the law maker from the words used, hence the issue of statutory interpretation.

Definition of Statutory Interpretation

The Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th edition defined statutory interpretation as “the

process by which courts interpret and apply legislation. It involves understanding the meaning of the words used in a statute and applying the statute to specific situations. This process may involve considering the plain meaning of the text, the context in which the statute was enacted, the purpose behind the law, and sometimes the legislative history. Courts may also employ various interpretive canons and principles to resolve ambiguities or unclear language within the statute.

This definition reflects the complex process courts engage in to discern legislative intent and apply laws to particular cases”.

The following are definitions of the term statutory interpretation proffered by notable Nigerian legal scholars, which have remained as legal authorities since

times past:

1. Professor Ben Nwabueze

In his book “Constitutional Democracy in Africa”, Professor Nwabueze defines statutory interpretation as the process by which the judiciary interprets and applies the provisions of a statute. He emphasizes that the judiciary’s role is to discover the intention of the legislature by analyzing the wording of the statute;

2. Justice Niki Tobi

Justice Tobi, in his book “The Nigerian Judge and His Court”, describes statutory

interpretation as the art and science of ascertaining the true meaning of a law as

expressed in its language. He highlights that the purpose of interpretation is to give effect to the intention of the legislature while ensuring that the interpretation aligns with the principles of justice and fairness;

3. Professor I.O. Agbede

In his work on statutory interpretation, Professor Agbede defines it as the judicial process of giving meaning to the words used in a statute. He points out that this process involves understanding the literal meaning of the words as well as considering the context and purpose of the statute;

4. Justice Chukwudifu Oputa

The indisputably acknowledged Socrates of the supreme court of Nigeria,

Chukwudifu Oputa JSC (as he then was), in his writings and judgments, Justice

Oputa emphasized that statutory interpretation is a judicial function aimed at giving effect to the intent of the legislature. He noted that the courts must interpret statutes within the confines of the language used, but they should also consider the purpose and spirit of the law.

These definitions reflect the general consensus among Nigerian legal authorities that statutory interpretation is a critical function of the judiciary, focused on determining and applying the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statutory language.

In summary, statutory interpretation is the process of determining what a statute or a legal document means. It is the act of explaining or expounding the intended significance of language used in the written law.

Importance of Statutory Interpretation

Statutory interpretation is crucial in the Nigerian legal system because it ensures that laws are applied correctly and consistently. Given the complexity and potential ambiguity in legislation, courts must in the interpretation of statutes, determine the lawmakers’ intent and apply the law to specific cases.

This process upholds the rule of law, ensures justice, and clarifies legal principles, helps maintain social order and legal certainty in Nigeria.

The following are some challenges faced by Nigerian courts with regards statutory interpretation.

Challenges of Statutory Interpretation

1. Ambiguity of Language

The language used in statutes can often be vague or ambiguous, leading to different interpretations. Words can have multiple meanings, and the context may not always clarify the intended meaning. In the case of Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Attorney-General of the Federation, the Supreme Court had to interpret the term “consultation” in the Constitution. The ambiguity of the term led to differing opinions on whether it required actual agreement or merely discussions.

2. Literal Versus Purposive Interpretation

Courts often face the dilemma of whether to interpret statutes literally (focusing strictly on the words Used) or purposively (considering the broader intent of the law). In the case of A-G of the Federation v. Abubakar (2007), the Supreme Court faced the challenge of whether to adopt a literal or purposive approach when interpreting the constitutional provision regarding the resignation of the Vice President. The Court opted for a purposive approach, considering the broader implications of the law.

3. Obsolete Legislation Challenge

Some statutes in Nigeria are outdated and may not adequately address contemporary issues, therefore leading to challenges in interpretation. In the case of Awolowo v. Shagari (1979), the court had to interpret an outdated electoral provision, which led to significant debate on the correct interpretation of “two-thirds of 19 states.” This case highlighted the difficulties in applying old laws to modern circumstances.

4. Conflict Between Statutes

There have been instances where different statutes appear to conflict with each other, making it difficult for the courts to determine which should prevail. In the case of Savannah Bank Ltd v. Ajilo (1989), the court had to resolve a conflict between the Land Use Act and the Companies Act regarding the mortgaging of land. The Court’s interpretation was crucial in determining which statute took precedence.

5. Socio-Political Influence

The interpretation of statutes can sometimes be influenced by the socio-political context, leading to decisions that may not be strictly legalistic. In Lakanmi v. Attorney-General (West) (1971), the court had to interpret the emergency powers of the government in the context of political upheaval. The decision to declare certain decrees invalid reflected the tension between law and politics.

6. Use of Foreign Precedents

Nigerian courts often rely on foreign cases for statutory interpretation, which can be problematic due to differences in legal systems and contexts. In Ebhodaghe v. Okoye (2004), the court used foreign case law to interpret a local statute, which led to debates about the appropriateness of such reliance in the Nigerian context.

7. Judicial Activism Versus Judicial Restraint

Courts sometimes struggle with the balance between judicial activism (where judges are more inclined to interpret laws in a way that promotes social change) and judicial restraint (where judges adhere strictly to the letter of the law). In the case of Udoh v. Orthopedic Hospitals Management Board (1993), the court demonstrated judicial activism by interpreting the law in a manner that favored the protection of workers’ rights, even though the statute was not explicit on the issue.

These challenges demonstrate the complexities involved in statutory interpretation in Nigeria. However, the Nigerian Court must navigate these difficulties while striving to ensure justice and the correct application of the law.

There are majorly three methods or principles of statutory interpretation, they are: the Literal rule, Golden rule and the Mischief rule of statutory interpretation.

A. Literal Rule of Interpretation

This is based on the premise that the office of a judge is “Jus dicere” and not “Jus dare”, that is, to state the law, not to make the law. The literal rule is the primary or plain rule of interpretation. By the literal rule, words used in a statute are given their plain and ordinary grammatical meaning, especially where the words used are plain and unambiguous.

If the words are used in relation to a trade or business, they are to be given their usual meaning in the trade or business. It is immaterial that hardship will result from literal interpretation. The locus classicus case on the subject is R v. Bangaza (1960). Here, the federal supreme court had to interpret section 319 (2) of the Criminal Code which provides that;

“Where an offender who in the opinion of the court has not attained the age of 17 years has been found guilty of murder, such offender shall not be sentenced to death but shall be ordered to be detained”

The Court held that, from the clear wording of the statute, the relevant age was the at the time of conviction not the age at the time of commission of the offence. The court therefore rejected the view that the relevant age was the age at the time of the commission of the offence.

In the case of Global Excellence Communications Ltd v. Donald Duke (2007). The Plaintiff/Respondent sued the publishers of the Global Excellence Weekly Magazine for libel. The Defendants/Appellants filed a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the court to hear the matter on the ground that based on section 308 of the CFRN, the Plaintiff/Respondent cannot continue with any proceeding in his personal capacity or can any proceeding be instituted against him during his lifetime of office.

The trial court held in favour of the appellants and dismissed the suit. The court of appeal reversed the judgement and held in favour of the Plaintiff/ Respondent. The appellants again appealed to the Supreme Court which held that section 308 confers absolute immunity on the president, vice- president, governors and deputy- governors and does not incapacitate them from suing in their personal capacity.

The literal rule of interpretation even though simple, has its merits and demerits. literal rule of interpretation is very straightforward and simple to apply thereby saving the time of the court it is geared towards conservatism.

On the other hand, its disadvantage is that it’s application may lead to absurdity, hardship, miscarriage of justice, give rise to the court giving different/conflicting decisions and consequences not intended by the legislature.

B. Golden Rule.

This rule is to the effect that where the strict application of the literal rule will lead to absurdity, inconsistency, injustice and hardship, the language or words should be modified to discover the intention of the legislature.

In other words, the golden rule is to be adopted when there will be absurdity resulting from the reliance on the literal rule. This was formulated by Baron Park in the case of Becke v. Smith.

Thus, where a provision in a statute is capable of more than one meaning, the golden rule enables the judge to adopt a meaning which will avoid absurdity and promote the intention of legislators.

For example, in the case of R. v. Princewill, the defendant was married under the Marriage Act but went through another form of marriage with a different woman. He was charged with bigamy and he argued that his second marriage did not fall under ‘marriage’ under the Act.

The court applied the golden rule and held that the word “marries” in the Act was to mean any form of marriage while the initial marriage still subsisted.

In Awolowo v. Federal Minister of Internal Affairs, the court held that section 21(5)(c) of the 1960 Constitution which provided that an accused was entitled to a legal representative of his choice, such legal representative if not Nigerian must be entitled to enter Nigeria as of right. See also the case of Council of University of Ibadan v. Ademoletun.

C. Mischief Rule.

This rule requires the court to look to what the law was before the statute was passed in order to discover what gap or mischief the statute was intended to cover. This rule gives a judge more discretion than either the literal or the golden rule.

The court is then required to interpret the statute in such a way to ensure that the gap is covered. The rule was expounded in Heydon’s Case (1584), where the court held that for a true interpretation of statute, four things have to be considered:

a. What was the common law before the making of the Act.

b. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.

c. What remedy Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth.

d. The true reason of the remedy.

The Judge therefore is to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. This rule gives the court justification for going behind the actual wording of the statute in order to consider the problem that the particular statute was aimed at remedying.

At some point, it was believed to be the most flexible rule of interpretation, but it is limited to using previous common law to determine what mischief the act in question was designed to remedy.

In the case of Re Sussex Peerage it was held that the mischief rule should only be applied where there is ambiguity in the statute. An example of the use of the mischief rule is found in the case of Corkery v Carpenter (1951).

In 1951, Shane Corkery was sentenced to one month’s imprisonment. At about 2.45 p.m on 18 January 1950, the defendant was drunk and was pushing his pedal bicycle along Broad Street in Ilfracombe. He was subsequently charged under section 12 of the Licensing Act 1872 with being drunk in charge of a carriage. The 1872 Act made no actual reference to bicycles.

The court elected to use the mischief rule to decide the matter. The purpose of the Act was to prevent people from using any form of transport on a public highway whilst in a state of intoxication. The bicycle was clearly a form of transport and therefore the user was correctly charged.

Mischief rule of interpretation is a discretionary power that the courts employ to clarify legislative intent and to bring out the true essence of such legislation in other to meet the ends of justice. Also see the cases of Emeloju v. State, Seaford court estate Ltd. v. Asher, Gorris v. Scott, Smith v. Hughes. These cases reinforce the uniqueness and importance of the mischief rule of interpretation.

CONCLUSION.

The legal duty of the judiciary not to make laws, but to interpret them. But sometimes certain situations arise where it becomes unavoidable to not interfere with the activities of legislation.

This kind of situation arises when a particular law is ambiguous, vague or has failed to keep up with time and therefore needs the judicial intervention to remain contemporary and it in carrying out their duty of interpreting laws, consequently make new laws or set new precedents.

List of Authorities Cited.

Articles Cited

1. Professor Ben Nwabueze “Constitutional Democracy in Africa”.

2. Justice Niki Tobi “The Nigerian Judge and his Court”.

Statutes Cited

1. Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition.

2. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) as amended.

3. The Criminal Code.

4. The Licensing Act, (1872).

Case Laws.

1. Attorney-General of Bendel State V. Attorney-General of the Federation

& 22 Others (SC. 17/1981) [1981] NGSC 5

2. Attorney General of the Federation and Others v Alhaji Atiku Abubakar

and Others (2007) 2 All N.L.R. 58

3. Awolowo v. Shagari (1979) All NLR 120

4. Savannah Bank (Nig.) Ltd. v. Ajilo (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 97) 305

5. Lakanmi & Anor. V. AG. West & Ors (1970) SC.58/69

6. Okoye v. Ebhodaghe (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 640) 250

7. Udoh v. Orthopaedic Hospitals Management Board (1993) 7 NWLR

(pt.303), 132.

8. R v Bangaza, (1960) 5 FSC 1

9. Duke v. Global Excellence Comm. Ltd. (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1026) 81

10. Becke v. Smith (1836) 2 M & W 191

11. R v. Prince will (1963) ALL NLR 478

12. Awolowo v Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs (1962) LLR 177

13. Adamolekun v Council of University of Ibadan, (1967) 1 ALL NLR 213

14. Heydon’s case (1584)76 ER 637

15. Emeloju v. State (1988) LPELR-1126(Sc).